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Abstract
It is interesting to discover that there is a reasonably small but growing literature on the issue and role of trust in
IS outsourcing in the past few years. Built on the premise that over-reliance on outsourcing contract and/or other
form of formal controls do not necessarily deliver a successful outsourcing partnership and/or outcomes, we
have explored another dimension of outsourcing relationship – ‘trust’. This paper is written to further explore
the role of trust and its relationship with formal controls within the context of IS outsourcing. The paper
advocates that ‘trust’ is a powerful factor that is intricately linked to the success of outsourcing activities and
that those engaged in an outsourcing relationship needs to find a balance between trust and formal controls.
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INTRODUCTION
Information Systems (IS) outsourcing is not a new phenomenon. Going through the outsourcing literature over
the past three decades, it was not surprising to have found that research issues on this topic have shifted over
time, reflecting the changes in outsourcing practices (Lee et al. 2003) and views. Most of the early literature on
IS outsourcing centered on the acquisition (Buchowicz 1991) because organisations considered outsourcing as a
‘product’ and hence, they focused on issues of how to acquire it effectively (Lee et al. 2003). Meantime, the
pivotal debates were focussed predominantly around issues such as whether IS activities should be performed by
an outside party (i.e. vendor) or should remain in-house. Thus, the make-or-buy decision between internally and
externally developed technologies was the main research stream dominated in the 1980s. Further, after the
‘Kodak Effect’ announcement (Loh and Venkatraman 1992), interest in IS outsourcing surged and outsourcing
was then seen as having a serious impact in the management of Information Systems. As a result, the
determinants and potential benefits with risks of outsourcing became a major research stream (e.g. Lacity and
Hirschheim 1993; Loh and Venkatraman 1992), with a number of literature emphasising on cost drivers within
the context of transaction cost economics and agency theories (Goles and Chin 2005). Over time, outsourcing
broadened to include variations in terms of orientations (commodity-oriented or strategic-oriented) and scope
(total or selective) of outsourced functions (Dibbern et al. 2004), along with the recognised relevance of
contextual factors such as informal (non-contractual) factors as trust and psychological contracts, which might
be implemented at different moments during the interorganisational relationship (e.g. Koh et al. 2004;
Sabherwal 1999; Willcocks and Kern 1998). In particular, research in the late 1990s started to focus more on
relationship management in IS outsourcing, encouraging organisations to recede tactical objectives into the
background and concentrate on strategic outcomes, while such research issues as contracts and partnership have
been spelled out as two elements of relationship management in IS outsourcing (Willcocks and Kern 1998). As a
client-vendor relationship have shifted towards more strategic focus, a variety of contractual agreements has
emerged, ranging from tight contracts to partnerships (e.g. Barthélemy and Geyer 2005), while an effective
relationship has become a key predictor of outsourcing success (Lee and Kim 1999).
Nonetheless, the recent existing studies on IS outsourcing have mainly examined partnership factors that
influence IS outsourcing effectiveness (Goo and Nam 2007), there are two prevailing perspectives in
interorganisational relationships which are widely employed for different goals and types of outsourcing
arrangements. Formal controls are represented by the written legal agreement and management-initiated
activities designed to guide behaviour toward the set objectives, whereas informal controls are unwritten, socialexchange based activities designed to influence the process and behavior based on trust and societal
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enforcements (Goo 2008). Within the IS outsourcing field, the scholars investigate the relationship between
relational governance mechanisms and outsourcing success. Although several studies highlighted the importance
of formal contract between the outsourcing parties (e.g. Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994; Kern and Willcocks
2002) in managing successful outsourcing relationship, there are many of those who focus more on the impact
of relational governance and the relationship quality on the IS outsourcing success (e.g. Kern 1997; Lee and
Kim 1999). Within this tradition, some studies speak for the value of so-called informal elements of the
relationship thereby de-emphasizing the role of formal contracts in the relationship (e.g. Koh et al. 2004), while
others view formal contracts as a more costly substitute for relational governance (e.g. Gulati 1995), so that the
presence of one governance mechanism obviates the need for the other (Poppo and Zenger 2002). However,
there are those who argue that both of the two mechanisms should function as complements in
interorganisational relationships (e.g. Poppo and Zenger 2002), while Woolthuis et al. (2005) empirically found
that trust and contract to be both complements and substitutes.
Recent research in IS outsourcing holds the opinion that trust and/or trust-based relationship and formal controls
are both required (e.g. Barthélemy 2003; Sabherwal 1999). In particular, Barthélemy (2003) contends that the
interplay between the ‘hard side’ (i.e. the development and enforcement of the good contract) and the ‘soft side’
(i.e. the development of the trust-based relationship) of IS outsourcing management can lead to a virtuous circle.
However, there is very little empirical research that addresses a balance that might be established between the
formal contract and building trust (Sabherwal 1999). In particular, Sabherwal (1999) studies the role of trust in
outsourced IS development projects by high ranking such elements as trust, performance and structure, arguing
that they are dependent on each other, while suggesting that structure and trust should be placed in order to
achieve higher success in the outsourcing activity. However, while research-based and empirically-based reports
of organisational actions within the adopted outsourcing strategy accumulate own efforts to build trust between
the outsourcing sides (Sabherwal 1999) and set structural mechanisms for proper coordination of the
outsourcing project (Goo and Nam 2007; Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003), scholars have not yet gained a
thorough understanding of the determinants of these joint actions that might have explained the richness and
complexity of that balanced relationship between trust and controls. Hence, our primary research concern is to
refine and extend the ideas about the complexity of relationship between trust and formal controls in a number
of ways. First, we outline the state of the trust and formal controls literature within the outsourcing field and
make a case for examining the conjoint perspective on their interrelation from the transaction cost economics,
relation exchange and social exchange theories lenses. Second, we argue for the rationale of establishing a
balance between trust and controls within the outsourcing relationship, and provide arguments for the lack of
conceptual clarity in the current outsourcing literature with regards to the trust-control balance. Finally, we
present a conceptual framework for a managerial action that outlines the general processes by which outsourcing
organisations could take trust-initiating efforts and controls activities for enhancing the outsourcing success. The
framework enriches the holistic understanding of the relationship between those elements and might serve as a
starting point to provide deeper insights into maintaining the outsourcing relationship and enhancing the
prospects of success in IS outsourcing.

RESEARCH ON TRUST AND CONTROLS
Although the relationship between trust and control might be key to promoting organisational effectiveness, Das
and Teng (1998) argue that the current state of the literature is “unclear an inconclusive about the relationships
between trust and control” (p. 495). In the IS outsourcing area, much of this confusion results from the fact that
scholars very often conceptualise trust between the exchange partners as the necessary attribute of the quality of
the outsourcing relationship (e.g. Kern 1997; Kern and Willcocks 2000; Sabherwal 1999) and enabling factor for
the outsourcing success (Lee and Kim 1999). As Kern and Willcocks (2000) point out, while many researchers
mention the importance of the client-vendor relationship, few actually make this the main focus of their work.
Moreover, those studies that do focus on the relationship examine different aspects of it using a variety of
theoretical frameworks that usually hold unilateral perspective in explaining the nature of outsourcing
relationship (Goles and Chin 2005). There are several well-established models or frameworks for studying the IS
outsourcing relationship (e.g. Fleming and Low 2007; Goles and Chin 2005; Kern and Willcocks 2000) that
have been designed to provide an understanding of which factors should the outsourcing parties be aware of in
order to achieve the desired success in the outsourcing effort.
Further, according to Langfield-Smith and Smith (2005) there are only a few comprehensive models considering
the design of management control systems (MCS) in outsourcing relationships, namely as quoting them “Speklé
developed a model of control archetypes, based on transaction cost economics (TCE); Das and Teng modelled
the relationships between MCS, trust and risk in various types of interfirm relationships, and van der MeerKooistra and Vosselman developed a comprehensive model of management control, which was based on
principles of TCE but which integrated the role of trust” (p. 282). Similarly, in the area of organisational studies,
Long and Sitkin (2006) propose a theoretical framework outlining key factors (i.e. task controls and
organisational trust) that affect the particular types of trust-control balance processes that managers attempt to
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obtain. However, recurring to our main research concern, there is a very limited number of studies that address
jointly the relationship between trust and controls in a dynamic perspective. More specifically, Sabherwal
(1999) commemorates the necessity of balancing trust and structural controls while empirically revealing that
unspoken balance between trust and structural controls has been implicitly articulated by his project participants,
whereas Barthélemy (2003) finds that the congruence between hard and soft sides of IS outsourcing
management might be addressed via the appropriate management technique of joint collaboration of the set of
contractual activities and initial trust building and commitment between the partners which all in turn, will have
strong impact on both the cost reduction and performance metrics.
In addition, outsourcing arrangements differ in a variety of forms, as detailed by Lacity and Willcocks (1998).
However, at the underlying level of outsourcing initiatives, they have one common feature, namely participants
involved in some type of exchange and interactions with each other, the behaviour of whose is governed and
shaped by the formal contract (Goles and Chin 2005). Thus, a conceptual framework that takes into account both
the spirit of social exchange and the implications of the contract might be used as a starting point to provide
deeper insights into the outsourcing relationship itself and enhance the prospects of success in IS outsourcing.

DEFINING KEY ELEMENTS ON TRUST AND CONTROLS
In developing our perspective on the balancing relationship between trust and controls we acknowledge that
many scholars have articulated the skills and competencies organisations would need to manage the entire
process of the outsourcing relationship and what is more, have introduced research frameworks that encompass
diverse perspectives in terms of trust and control issues (e.g. Bensaou and Venkatraman 1996). However, we
define those issues within the context of outsourcing and describe them via utilising a transaction cost
economics approach and a number of theories with socio-relational foci.
The Formal Controls Perspective
Macneil (1978) defines an organisation to be “in significant ways, nothing more that a very complex bundle of
contractual relations” (p. 865). According to Macneil (1978), contracts are characterised by the following norms,
“…permitting and encouraging participation and exchange, promoting reciprocity, reinforcing role patterns
appropriate to the particular kinds of contracts providing limited freedom for exercise of choice effectuating
planning” (p. 895).
IS outsourcing is a boundary-spanning interorganisational relationship (Miranda and Kavan 2005), wherein the
contract defines the outsourcing arrangement and structures the interactions between the client and the vendor.
Outsourcing contract provides a legally bound, institutional framework in which each party’s rights, duties, and
responsibilities are codified and the goals, policies, and strategies underlying the arrangement are specified
(Gottschalk and Solli-Saether 2005). Every outsourcing contract is meant to reduce opportunism and facilitate
the business exchange between the partners. However, it is very unlikely that the contract can cover all future
contingencies. For example, Brynjolfsson (1994) in his work on the incomplete contract theory argues that “real
world contracts are almost always ‘incomplete’, in the sense that there are inevitably some circumstances or
contingencies that are left out of the contract, because they were either unforseen or simply too expensive to
enumerate in sufficient detail” (p. 1647). Formal contracts are often proved to be incomplete (Kern and
Willcocks 2001); most of them are either too loose (Lacity and Willcocks 2003) or too inflexible (Barthélemy
2001; Sabherwal 1999). Moreover, according to outsourcing practitioners, the incompleteness of outsourcing
contracts (IT outsourcing contracts, in particular) also associate with basic assumptions from the both
outsourcing sides with regard to disillusions that business requirements and technologies remain unchanged
throughout the length of the signed contract.
According to the transaction cost economics (TCE) logic, as exchange hazards rise, so must contractual
safeguards (Williamson 1985), which act to minimise the costs arising from such hazards and help to build the
initial relationship between the outsourcing parties (Goo and Nam 2007). Drawing on the TCE theory, the
outsourcing decision is often seen as a rational decision made by organisations that have considered transaction
related factors such as asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and the frequency of the transaction
(Williamson 1979). Similarly, the TCE is accepted as the common-based framework for viewing the choice of
governance structures in interorganisational relationships (Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003).
Many researchers have used a variety of terms across many disciplines (e.g. strategic management, (inter-)
organisations studies, IS outsourcing literature) on the control paradigm, such as ‘governance characteristics’ or
‘formal systems’ (e.g. Goo and Nam 2007; mostly of the interorganisational studies literature), ‘control systems’
(e.g. Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003), ‘moments of governance’ (e.g. Miranda and Kavan 2005), ‘structural
controls’ (Sabherwal 1999) and the like (Das and Teng 1998). Yet, many scholars have agreed upon a broader
concept of addressing controls as a set of mechanisms and/or activities (Long and Sitkin 2006) to be implied in
order to manage the ongoing process of development of the outsourcing project (e.g. Sabherwal 1999) or
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whereby one party affects the behaviour of the other (e.g. Das and Teng 1998). However, the rationale is that in
organisational studies and similar disciplines, the scholars associate the establishment of proper control
mechanisms in line with the attainment of high organisational effectiveness (Das and Teng 1998). By contrast,
in the IS outsourcing field, a formal contract usually takes a leading role and it specifies roles and
responsibilities of the outsourcing parties to be performed, it procedures for monitoring and penalties for noncompliance, rewards for outcomes attained, wherein every single activity usually is applied in compliance with
the letter of the contract. And many outsourcing researchers with both conceptual and empirical validations have
categorised contractual elements within the context of applied governance activities (e.g. Goo 2008; Kirsch
1997). In particular, those researchers who work closely with service level agreements and contractual issues
(e.g. Goo and Nam 2007; Grover et al. 1996; Kirsch 1997), distinguish contractual elements under governance
characteristics and divide them into communication plan (e.g. documented communication processes),
measurement charter (e.g. specifications of tactical measures of the performed project), conflict arbitration plan
(e.g. escalation measures), and enforcement plan (e.g. incentives and penalties based on performance) (for a
complete review, see Appendix 1). In sum, a formal contract embedded with a number of structural controls will
serve as a foundation for the development of the outsourcing relationship and the ongoing management of this
relationship towards achieving the desired outcomes.
However, we acknowledge that formal controls is a very crucial dimension of any business relationship that tie
business partners with obligations, reduce any chance of opportunism from the either side, specify a ‘working
context’ of the project and what is more, help to regulate and monitor the ongoing process of an organisational
activity. Yet, trust as an alternative source of relationships has been widely used to offset a negative and very
often narrowed implication of formal controls.
The Trust Perspective
Besides control, the literature suggests trust as a second source of good business interactions. In particular, trust
has been widely recognized as a facilitator of successful relationships between buyers and sellers in many
domains such as social exchange literature (e.g. Barber 1983), economics (e.g. Williamson 1985), marketing
(e.g. Mohr and Spekman 1994), management and organizational studies (e.g. Zaheer et al. 1998), and is one of
the most desired qualities in any close relationship (Mayer et al. 1995). As Das and Teng (1998) quote Arrow’s
work by saying that “virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly
conducted over a period of time” (p. 494). Despite its complexity and ambiguity that still wander among the
trust researchers (e.g. Mayer et al. 1995), many scholars agree upon the fact that trust reflects such common
features as positive expectations about another’s motives, vulnerability and risk-taking behaviour. For example,
Zaheer et al. (1998) have consolidated the knowledge on trust in interorganizational relationships and defined
trust as the expectation that a party will act predictably, will fulfil its obligations and will behave fairly even
when the possibility of opportunism is present.
Within the IS outsourcing context, researchers mainly focus on trust at an organizational level (e.g. Grover et al.
1996; Kern and Willcocks 2000; Lee and Kim 1999). For example, Kern and Willcocks (2000) define trust as
the belief that a promise is reliable and that it will be fulfilled as stated in the agreement. In general, researchers
seem to agree that trust refers to a relational aspect in IS outsourcing, in which the parties are willing to accept
risk for commitments that will result in a positive desired outcome. Accordingly, in the management of
outsourcing relationships, trust has a number of long-term benefits, namely it enables to focus on long-term
objectives, with less worry about routine reporting issues; it suppresses opportunism and increases the
cooperation between a client and a vendor; it enables risk-taking and reduces conflict (Klepper 1995). However,
outsourcing relationships are generally based upon contracts (or contractual agreements) and to achieve a winwin situation, both sides have to create a close relationship that operates within the “spirit of the contract” (Kern
1997, p. 37). Although the contractual agreements outline many issues and their consequences, it is unthinkable
to cover all contingencies in the contracts. Moreover, resorting to the contracts every time there is an issue is not
only time consuming but also may prove to be costly. Arguably, in order to achieve the expectations and
accomplishments for and from both sides, trust should be one of the centerpieces of such a relationship. In
response, Macneil as early as the late 1970s argued that traditional contract law did not adequately address the
empirical realities of modern business relationships, and that a set of norms had emerged that influenced and to
some extent governed exchanges between parties in an ongoing long term relationship (Macneil 1978). Thus, the
central argument in his studies is that relational exchange should be based on a social component (Goles and
Chin 2005; Goo and Nam 2007). Emerging from these early studies is a growing body of work emphasizing on
exchange relationships as opposed to exchanged events (Goles and Chin 2005), whereas relational exchange and
social exchange theories (e.g. Goles and Chin 2005; Gottschalk and Solli-Saether 2005) have been implied to
explain the newly born phenomenon as a relational contracting (see Williamson 1985). For example, Kern and
Willcocks (2000) give an explicit explanation of the difference between the traditional and relational contracts
by deriving so-called situational characteristics that encompass elements of long-term interdependence of
succeeding contracts, gradual development of enduring exchange relationship, reflecting on ongoing process and
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its gradual disintegration. A rich body empirical work has demonstrated that relational contracting largely has
been interlinked with relational governance (e.g. Poppo and Zenger 2002), which in turn, has been represented
by trust, commitment and cooperation, and what is more, it improves the performance of interorganisational
exchanges in general (e.g. Zaheer et al. 1998) and IS outsourcing in particular (e.g. Choudhury and Sabherwal
2003; Sabherwal 1999). In addition, such attributes as trust and commitment (Morgan and Hunt 1994) play a
major role in IS outsourcing relationships, whereas the successful management of the outsourcing relationship
today requires of highly interactive and flexible relationship between two organisations in order to sustain over
strategic planning horizon (Goo and Nam 2007; Sabherwal 1999).
Nevertheless, following the logic of TCE which explains that complete contracting is often impossible, while
incomplete contracts give rise to subsequent renegotiations when the balance of power is set (Gottschalk and
Solli-Saether 2005), relational attributes of exchange may play a role precisely instead of or along with
incomplete contracts. By initiating trust, organisations will lower the costs of monitoring and enforcing contract
and reduce opportunistic behaviour of the other party. In all, those transactors who have established relational
norms based on goodwill that can ease and lubricate the renegotiation process, they can reasonably expect to
incur lower ex post bargaining costs (Gottschalk and Solli-Saether 2005) and the de facto formal controls than
those who have not.

THE TRUST-CONTROL RELATIONSHIP
While research suggests that both trust and controls affect the performance and attainment of the set goals in
interorganisational relationships, Das and Teng (1998) observe that there exists “little consensus regarding the
relationship between trust and control” (p. 495). Concurrently, Long and Sitkin (2006) by quoting Bachmann
say that “there are numerous examples in the literature where control chases out trust and situations in which
trust seems to remove the necessity for control, there are equally as many examples of trust and control being
complementary, or going hand in hand” (p. 91). Some researchers claim that the control mechanisms and trust
can be pursued simultaneously, or ought to be complementary (e.g. Das and Teng 1998; Zaheer and
Venkatraman 1995), while others argue that control mechanisms are detrimental to trust (e.g. Bradach and
Eccles 1989; Lyons and Mehta 1997). Following this way, Woolthuis et al. (2005) derive three different views
on the role of contracts and their influence on trust, wherein first perspective is closely related to the logic of
TCE and contract theory that favours contract as a basis which is a prerequisite for trust; second perspective is
associated with the social scientists ‘worldview’ of envisaging contract as a detrimental factor to trust
development, and finally, the third interpretation is related to the statement that trust and contracts are negatively
related, with trust precedes contracts, and thereby contracts can as a result become unnecessary. However, mixed
reports based on the empirical evidence are likely to be found in the current research works with regard to the
relationship between trust and formal controls. In particular, studies found the evidence that high trust and
formal controls are found together and can be conceptualised as complementary mechanisms in
interorganisational studies (e.g. Poppo and Zenger 2002) or alternatively, some studies revealed that trust was
reducing the need for contracting and hence, it can be conceptualised as substitute for formal control (e.g. Gulati
1995). Some scholars have concentrated on the place of trust in governance relationships (e.g. Goo and Nam
2007). But the governance of relationships requires implementing structures and building trust (Barthélemy
2003). Moreover, a contract is one of the central elements for the business relationship development and
governance mechanism, whereas trust is the key attribute encouraged in the relational governance that facilitate
contractual refinements that further support greater relational exchanges. And thus, the key implication when
combining these two perspectives is that trust and control are related and that outsourcing parties should
consider both of them if they aim to optimise the effectiveness of their outsourcing strategy and enhance the
prospect of outsourcing success.
The Trust-Control Balance
In conceptualising the balance between initial trust-building and formal controls that organisations attempt to
obtain, we partly follow the definition outlined by Long and Sitkin (2006) in their study on trust-building and
task control that organisations achieve a trust-control balance when they obtain “a state where…[their
relations]…exhibit a harmonious integration of trust-building and…control activities” (p. 91). Using this
concept of balance, we propose that the level of such harmony achieved between a configuration of formal
controls and trust-building efforts is partially determined by the context within which that integration occurs
(Long and Sitkin 2006). So that while recognizing the value of such legalistic ‘remedies’ (Sako 1997) including
formalising contracts and applying appropriate structural controls, the outsourcing parties should not forget
about trust-initiating activities in order to act timely on changes occurred within the scope of the working
outsourcing relationships and outside them. More specifically, such formal activities (e.g. legal procedures,
formalised rules) might be used to guard against unfortunate contingencies which would undermine trust
relationships, whereas according to Sako (1997), “a greater formalisation of rules and procedures can restore
competence trust effectively by fostering coordination when past violations, in the form of underperformance
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are specific to a particular context or task” (p.12). Meanwhile, the total reliance on formal controls cannot
promote the value congruence between the outsourcing parties and will maintain the distance between the
parties, whereby exclusive reliance on trust can be dangerous (Sabherwal 1999). In sum, one could argue that
these ‘one-sided’ management activities will only raise unnecessary and unwanted challenges associated with
achieving the performance milestones, lack of vision, suspicion in partner’s expertise and ultimate delay of the
project.

THE TRUST-CONTROL BALANCE: PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK
We have so far identified key trust and formal controls concepts and discussed the joint relationship between the
two elements within the outsourcing context, and how this relationship is useful when addressing the
performance outcomes in the outsourcing project. The necessity of developing this conjoint managerial-based
perspective is further emphasized when one considers two additional observations regarding the management of
outsourcing relationships. First, while appearing static for periods of time, the particular mix of trust and control
in the relationship is constantly flux (Long and Sitkin 2006). And second, to address the dynamic nature of
relational and institutional arrangements, organisations should balance the mix of trust and control in their
outsourcing initiative if they wish to achieve the desired outcomes and cultivate positive social exchange. Thus,
in Figure 1 we depict our effort towards the general process of establishing a balance between trust and controls
within the outsourcing relationship context. Our conceptual framework builds on observations of earlier works
by Das and Teng (1998) on the relationship between trust and control in strategic alliances, by McEvily and
Zaheer (2006) on performance effects of trust and discussions derived from Lee et al.’s (2008) study on
integrative model of trust in IS outsourcing.

Figure 1: Preliminary framework for trust-control balance in IS outsourcing relationships
The proposed framework captures the multi-faceted aspects of trust and controls and their roles in the
outsourcing relationship. It has been constructed based on the understanding that trust and controls should be
both equal components which are required to be addressed conjointly in the IS outsourcing relationship in order
to improve chances for success. We assume that the collected knowledge at the trust-based and control-based
levels accumulated by the outsourcing parties in the working conditions may enhance the outcomes in their
outsourcing effort under the impact of mediating effects, which have been quite often marked by other
outsourcing researchers as enabling factors in the development of trust (Cong and Chau 2007; Lee et al. 2008)
and facilitating the contract-based relationship (Goo and Nam 2007). Also it is essential to articulate that both
trust and controls should be taken equally at once as complementary, yet independent dimensions of the
outsourcing relationship. In particular, a control-based relationship (i.e. presented at two sub-dimensions, formal
contract itself and associated structural controls) that was described with the TCE logic which in turn was
heavily criticised by ignoring the social context of business interactions (Gottschalk and Solli-Saether 2005),
should be complemented with trust (i.e. levels of trust, dimensions of trust and initial stages of trust building, for
further details see Bekmamedova et al. 2008) which serves as the glue for that relationship because quite often
partners committed themselves and made contributions to their relationship that would go beyond what had been
specified in the contract. However, it cannot be assumed that a trust-based relationship or a control-base
relationship solely will always lead to successful results in the outsourcing arrangement (Goo and Nam 2007;
Lee et al. 2008).
Further, the IS outsourcing relationship depends very much on the context which encapsulates the specific
objectives and expectations (e.g. financial, technical, and political issues) (Kern 1997; Kern and Willcocks
2000), which in turn reflect the organisational conditions of parties involved in the outsourcing relationship.
Within this context, both of these elements are filtered into the active trust level and active control level
accordingly. In turn, the level of control has a direct influence on the level of trust within the relationship (Das
and Teng 1998), whereas initial trust-building does not influence the level of control directly, but rather
moderates relationship between the level of control and resulting quality of the relationship (Kern and Willcocks
2000). Herein, the outsourcing parties specify the context of relationship addressing the relevant to their specific
circumstances (e.g. the core/non-core outsourced project, short-/or long-term outsourcing contract, history and
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length of the outsourcing relationship), as is assumed to be the temporal notion (as dotted level shown in the
framework) due to the dynamics of the outsourcing relationship and nature of the outsourced project. Moreover,
whereas the current literature argues for a direct effect of trust on outsourcing success (e.g. Lee and Kim 1999),
while the outsourcing research of the early 1990s favours for the contract which prescribes the dimension of
success (e.g. Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994; Lacity and Hirschheim 1993), there are those scholars on the
contrary, who argue that there exist so-called enabling factors that mediate the process of development of the
outsourcing relationship with the achievement of the outsourcing success (e.g. Cong and Chau 2007; Lee et al.
2008). Accordingly, the latter argue for the existence of those effects due to a number of reasons, namely the IS
outsourcing is not limited to a ‘tangible product’ only but also includes ‘intangible assets’ such as knowledge of
business processes (Lee et al. 2008) and ‘relation-specific consequences’ such as the relational governance and
mutual dependency (e.g. Bensaou and Venkatraman 1996; Mohr and Spekman 1994). For example, when the
size of the exchange increases and the importance of that exchange is recognised, the level of dependency is
high which in turn, may result in a higher quality of the relationship (Lee and Kim 1999). In general, the
described mediating effects should be divided according to the framework, into so-called external factors that
are determined by the current business condition and specific circumstances of the involved outsourcing
organisations (e.g. business environment, cultural commonality); trust-driven consequences including
knowledge-sharing, relational governance and mutual dependency (see Lee et al. 2008); and finally, controldriven consequences which are caused by the application of structural mechanisms and other reporting and
nearby monitoring management activities that help to maintain the working process of the outsourcing project.
Subsequently, the accumulated attempt of the outsourcing sides to find a balanced level between the trustinitiating efforts and the control-based activities within their working outsourcing settings and then, to address
adequately the mediating effects that might either facilitate or procrastinate the further performance of the
project, will bring to the ultimate outsourcing outcomes. However, the latter is a subject of further research and
requires a more rich and thorough in-depth analysis of exploration. Again, we acknowledge that by articulating
outsourcing outcomes, there is a plenty of discussions in this area (e.g. Goo and Nam 2007; Goo 2008) which
should not be limited only to ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the project and thereby, we envisage that this challenge
could be achieved by conducting empirical research using this framework.
In sum, based on these premises by finding a proper balance both parties are able to sustain a more effective
outsourcing relationship over time, while the presence of both the elements will lead to the shared perceptions
and hence, to better outsourcing performance.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In a highly complex and risky activity such as IS outsourcing, over-reliance on formal control mechanisms and
approaches are not only impractical and expensive, but also counter-productive and may result in unsatisfactory
outsourcing outcome. This paper explores the concept of trust in IS outsourcing relationships and argues that
there is a need of balance between trust and formal controls in order to reach the expected outcome of IS
outsourcing. Exploring the issue of such ‘balance’ between trust and control is indeed an interesting concept that
the authors feel need to be empirically studied further. The framework emerged from the exploration of the key
literature in the area of trust, formal controls (i.e. contract and structural mechanisms), and IS outsourcing could
be used as a starting point to better understand why some outsourcing activities resulted in unsatisfactory
outcomes (including prolonged episodes of litigations and legal battles) and some produced excellent values and
Return on Investments for the outsourcing vendor and the client. Thus, as the starting point of our research
endeavours, we assume that this is the type of phenomenon that would be served well by interpretive research.
In particular, the multiple case study approach will be used as the main research method to investigate the
articulated area of research interest, while the method of narrative inquiry will be served as the supplementary
research approach further at the stage of data analysis. We firmly believe that the interpretive data collected for
this study should be based on the derived individual perceptions of trust and controls judged by the key players
from case to case, rather than empirical hypotheses aimed to test and measure different elements of the proposed
framework.
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APPENDIX 1: THE GOVERNANCE ELEMENTS FOUND IN SERVICE LEVEL
AGREEMENT IN IS OUTSOURCING1
Governance
characteristics

Mechanisms that
mitigate
disruptions

Rewards or
sanctions for
meetings or
missing the
targets

Setting and
checking
performance
targets, interim
milestones to
ensure that the
relationship
remains on
course

Contractual
elements of
SLA

Communication
plan

Measurement
charter

Clauses in practice
• Organisational reporting
structure;

Scheduled
interaction and
communication
such as formal
meetings and
reporting

• Identified
communication
initiatives;
• Communication
schedules and media.

Tactical
measurements of
service performance
and success metrics
(in line with a
vendor’s strategic
plan)

• Definition of processes
to periodically measure
the defined categories;
• Interfaces with the
feedback plan and etc.

Supporting theories

TCE (Williamson 1979)
SLA templates (Grover et
al. 1996; Kern and
Willcocks 2002; Lee and
Kim 1999; Singleton et al.
1988)
TCE (Klein et al. 1978)
Control theory and SLA
templates (e.g. Choudhury
and Sabherwal 2003;
Kirsch 1997; Singleton et
al. 1988)

• Process descriptions of
the interaction;
Conflict
arbitration

Balance of power
that imposes one’s
will on others

• Schedule for regular
interactions and
timetables for resolving
issues between the
parties;

Relational exchange
theory and SLA templates
(e.g. Lewicki and Bunker
1996; Mohr and Spekman
1994)

• Practices and conduct
rules required to
preserve the
independence of the
independent advisor etc.

Enforcement

1

Contractual issues
of SLA in IS
Outsourcing

Carrot-and-stick;
sharing of benefits
and burdens

• Detailed list of all
penalty assumptions
(e.g. reporting process,
knowledge transfer)

TCE (Klein et al. 1978)
SLA templates (Singleton
et al. 1988)

Governance characteristics have been partially adapted from Goo (2008, pp. 5-6)
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